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ALLOCATION OF THE RISKS OF SKIING: A CALL FOR
THE REAPPLICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL COMMON
LAW PRINCIPLES
ARTHUR B. FERGUSON, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Skiing is a unique and special sport in which an individual skier's
abilities are constantly pitted against a changing winter mountain envi-
ronment, ranging from gentle groomed trails to steep, ungroomed
slopes. The essence of skiing is the continual challenge of making suc-
cessful, individual assessments about one's own abilities in light of the
available terrain choices and varying snow conditions.
Fueled by a significant growth in the popularity of the sport as a
major recreational activity, ski area operators have invested millions of
dollars in technological advances to develop, operate and maintain their
areas. Not surprisingly, the ski industry, in general, has become an im-
portant factor in the economies of many communities and states. How-
ever, individually, many ski areas have become the frequent targets of
litigation arising from injuries sustained by skiers.
Application of common law negligence principles by the courts to
the sport of skiing has shifted between the inconsistent use of various
legal doctrines and has drifted away from an analytical assessment and
allocation of the appropriate responsibilities of skiers and ski area oper-
ators. In many states, legislation has been enacted in an effort to more
clearly define the relative duties and responsibilities. As a result, many
courts have struggled to fit novel statutory requirements into the com-
mon law frame of analysis.
This article will first outline the development of the common law as
applied to the sport of skiing. Second, subsequent codifications affect-
ing the determination of liability will be traced. Finally, this article will
argue for a return to the fundamentals of tort law to properly assess and
allocate legal responsibility for the risks associated with the sport of ski-
ing. In each individual case, this framework will provide the basis for an
analysis of whether there was a legal duty on the ski area operator upon
which the injured skier may sustain an action in negligence.
Three recent Colorado Supreme Court cases provide the stepping
stones for going back to the basics in the application of tort law to the
sport of skiing. These cases suggest how common law principles of neg-
ligence may be reconciled with the recent statutory revisions and how a
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common sense approach may be available in the determination of liabil-
ity for injuries arising from the inherent risks of skiing.
II. THE COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT
The evolution of negligence law in the sport of skiing began with
the historic case of Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc. 1 Since that decision,
in 1951, involving the assessment of the responsibilities of a ski area
operator and an injured skier, many different aspects of skiing have been
litigated including ski school classes2 , skiing competitions3 , ski lift acci-
dents4 , ski lift loading and unloading accidents 5 , collisions with ski area
1. 96 F. Supp. 786 (D. Vt. 1951).
2. Ninio v. Hight, 385 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1967)("rules of road" applicable in skier-
skier collision); Heath v. Aspen Skiing Corp., 325 F. Supp. 223 (D. Colo. 1971)(dismissal
of complaint based upon refusal to permit independent ski instructor at ski area); Davis v.
Erickson, 53 Cal. 2d 860, 350 P.2d 535, 3 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1960)(proximate cause instruc-
tion necessary in a collision between a ski school student-plaintiff and another skier); Sum-
mit County Development Corp. v. Bagnoli, 166 Colo. 27, 441 P.2d 658 (1968)(no
assumption of risk instruction when ski school student misloaded lift); Seidl v. Trol-
Ihaugen, Inc., 305 Minn. 506, 232 N.W.2d 236 (1975)(comparative negligence instruction
upheld in collision with ski instructor action); Elliott v. Taos Ski Valley, Inc., 83 N.M. 575,
494 P.2d 1392 (N.M. App. 1972)(application of traditional negligence law to injury of a ski
school student when instructor failed to summon assistance), aff'd, 83 N.M. 763, 497 P.2d
974.
3. Garretson v. United States, 456 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1972)(release upheld in jump-
ing competition accident); Marietta v. Cliff's Ridge, Inc., 20 Mich. App. 449, 174 N.W.2d
164 (1969)(liability for use of inappropriate slalom poles), affd, 385 Mich. 364, 189
N.W.2d 208 (1971); Vogel v. West Mountain Corp., 97 A.D.2d 46, 470 N.Y.S.2d 475
(1983)(mere sponsorship of a race did not create a duty to a racer on the part of the
sponsor); Douglass v. Skiing Standards, Inc., 142 Vt. 634, 459 A.2d 97 (1983)(release up-
held in a skiing competition accident).
4. Trigg v. City and County of Denver, 784 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1986)(negligence
per se instruction appropriate in a lift accident but not a res ipsa loquitur instruction under
the facts presented); Noto v. Pico Peak Corp., 469 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1972)(instructions
and warnings regarding maintenance of a lift bullwheel do not cover defective designs);
Sabo v. Breckenridge Lands, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 602 (D. Colo. 1966)(contributory negli-
gence not a bar to recovery if ski area is subsequently in a position to avoid the injury and
prevent harm), appeal denied, 376 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1967); Miller v. Arnal Corp., 129 Ariz.
484, 632 P.2d 987 (1981)(no liability for failure to rescue campers stranded in storm);
Anderson v. Heron Engineering Co., 40 Colo. App. 191, 575 P.2d 16 (1977)(lift manufac-
turer held to express warranties regarding safety), rev'd, 198 Colo. 391, 604 P.2d 674
(1979); Lewis v. Big Powderhorn Mountain Ski Corp., 69 Mich. App. 437, 245 N.W.2d 81
(1976)(strict liability not applicable in rope tow accident); Pessl v. Bridger Bowl, 164
Mont. 389, 524 P.2d 1101 (1974)(standard of reasonable care applicable in lift operations
under Montana Passenger Tramway Act); Cowan v. Tyrolean Ski Area, Inc., 127 N.H. 397,
506 A.2d 690 (1985)(inadequate jury instructions in chair lift incident); Bolduc v. Herbert
Schneider Corp., 117 N.H. 566, 374 A.2d 1187 (1977); Ford v. Black Mountain Tramways,
Inc., 110 N.H. 20, 259 A.2d 129 (1969)(ski area not a manufacturer or seller of tramway,
only an entity providing transportation service and thus no action under strict liability);
Allen v. State, 110 N.H. 42, 260 A.2d 454 (1969)(operator of ski lift a common carrier);
Lippman v. State, 83 A.D.2d 700, 442 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1981)(res ipsa loquitur applicable in
case where chairs with riders fell to ground); Lawrence v. Davos, Inc., 46 A.D.2d 41, 360
N.Y.S.2d 730 (1974)(res ipsa loquitur instruction rejected in lift case where plaintiff failed
to use safety chains); Albert v. State, 80 Misc. 2d 105, 362 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1974)(lifts under
New York statutory law not common carriers), aff'd, 51 A.D.2d 611, 378 N.Y.S.2d 125
(1976); Friedman v. State, 54 Misc. 2d 448, 282 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1967)(operator ofa ski lift
is a common carrier), rnodified, 31 A.D.2d.992, 297 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1969); Vogel v. State,
204 Misc. 614, 124 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1953)(contributory negligence in not freeing ski poles
from chair barred recovery in lift unloading accident); Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain,
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equipment 6 and other skiers 7, skier collisions with natural objects and
skier falls8 . Courts have also addressed evidentiary issues9 , applications
Inc., 21 Wash. App. 130, 584 P.2d 432 (1978)(obligations to invitee in lift accident only
apply to those parts of property which are in the scope of the invitation), aft'd, 93 Wash. 2d
127, 606 P.2d 1214 (1980).
5. Hunt v. Sun Valley Company, Inc., 561 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1977)(highest degree of
care applied to lift operation, yet strict liability rejected); Riblet Tramway Company v.
Monte Verde Corp., 453 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1972)(standard of highest degree of care as
common carrier for lift operations); Houser v. Floyd, 220 Cal. App. 2d 778, 34 Cal. Rptr.
96 (1963)(res ipsa loquitur not applicable in lift case); Summit County Development Corp.
v. Bagnoli, 166 Colo. 27, 441 P.2d 658 (1968);Jordan v. Loveland Skiing Corp., 503 P.2d
1034 (Colo. App. 1972)(res ipsa loquitur instruction rejected in lift unloading case); Arap-
ahoe Basin, Inc. v. Fischer, 28 Colo. App. 580, 475 P.2d 631 (1970)(instructions on con-
tributory negligence sufficient in lift related accident without instruction on assumption of
risk); Grauer v. State, 9 A.D.2d 829, 192 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1959)(operator of a ski lift not
subject to res ipsa loquitur); Math v. State, 37 Misc. 2d 1023, 237 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1962)(op-
erator of lift has same duty as a common carrier).
6. Leopold v. Okemo Mountain, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 781 (D. Vt. 1976)(skier collision
with unpadded lift tower assumed risks of losing control); Phillips v. Monarch Recreation
Corp., 668 P.2d 982 (Colo. App. 1983)(ski area liable in skier collision with sno-cat for
failure to warn skier of grooming activities as required by Colorado Ski Safety Act of
1979); Rowett v. Kelly Canyon Ski Hill, Inc., 102 Idaho 708,639 P.2d 6 (1981)(lighting for
night skiing held to be adequate); Green v. Sherburne Corp., 137 Vt. 310, 403 A.2d 278
(1979)(skier collision with unpadded utility pole; ski area subject to "ordinary" care).
7. Rosen v. LTV Recreational Development, Inc., 569 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1978)(in
collision with skier and then a metal pole, assumption of the risk is a species of contribu-
tory negligence; reasonable man standard applicable); LaVine v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp.,
557 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1977)(in skier-skier collision, recognition of "rule of road" for
downhill skier to yield to skiers below); Ninio v. Hight, 385 F.2d 350 (10th Cir.
1967)("rules of road" applicable in skier-skier collision); McDaniel v. Dowell, 210 Cal.
App. 2d 26, 26 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1962)(operation of tow rope not that of a common carrier
since it does not physically carry the skier); Seidl v. Trollhaugen, 305 Minn. 506, 232
N.W.2d 236 (1975)(skier-skier collision where secondary assumption of risk did not in-
clude the risk of being hit by another skier); Goss v. Allen, 134 N.J. Super. 99, 338 A.2d
820 (1975)(standard of care for minor in skier collision case is that required of a reason-
able person of like age, intelligence and experience); Morse vs. State, 262 A.D. 324, 29
N.Y.S.2d 34 (194 1)(sledding not an inherent danger to a novice skier in a collision with the
sled on a ski slope), aff'd, 287 N.Y. 666, 39 N.E.2d 288 (1941).
8. Rimkus v. Northwest Colorado Ski Corp., 706 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir. 1983)(evi-
dence of remedial repairs permitted); Rosen v. LTV Recreational Development, Inc., 569
F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1978)(in collision with skier and then a metal pole, assumption of the
risk is a species of contributory negligence; reasonable man standard applicable); Man-
nhard v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 682 P.2d 64 (Colo. App. 1983)(standard of reasonable
care for operation in case where skier was killed in an out-of-bounds avalanche since activ-
ity is not "inherently dangerous"); Murphy v. Chestnut Mountain Lodge, Inc., 124 Ill.
App. 3d 508, 464 N.E.2d 818 (1984)(no duty to skier regarding skiing equipment without
evidence on the existence of anti-friction devices on the skis); Tarlowe v. Metropolitan Ski
Slopes, Inc., 34 A.D.2d 905, 311 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1970)(failure of bindings to release could
be attributed to a defect in the equipment), rev'd, 28 N.Y.2d 410, 271 N.E.2d 515, 322
N.Y.S.2d 665, on remand, 37 A.D.2d 810, 324 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1971); Kaufman v. State, I I
Misc. 2d 56, 172 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1958)(skier accepts risk of collision with rock as inherent in
the sport in so far as it was obvious and necessary); Blair v. Mt. Hood Meadows Develop-
ment Corp., 48 Ore. App. 109, 616 P.2d 535 (1980)(assumption of the risk no longer a
separate defense due to statutory language; skier is an invitee), rev'd, 291 Or. 293, 630
P.2d 827, reh gdenied, 291 Or. 703, 634 P.2d 241 (1981); Zimmer v. Mitchell and Ness, 253
Pa. Super. 474, 385 A.2d 437 (1978)(ski rental release upheld), aff'd, 490 Pa. 428, 416
A.2d 1010 (1980); Rubin v. Loon Mountain Recreation Corp., No. 84-6248 (D.C. Penn.
Oct. 18, 1985)(1985 WL 101)(ski rental release upheld); Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 136 Vt.
293, 390 A.2d 398 (1978)(primarv assumption of risk in skiing fall not applicable if a ski
area operator duty exists and is breached); Meese v. Brigham Young University, 639 P.2d
720 (Utah 1981)(beginning skier noi held to assume risk regarding binding adjustment).
9. Rimkus v. Northwest Colorado Ski Corp., 706 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir. 1983)(evi-
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of statutes of limitations' 0 , standards of care II and the constitutionality
of statutes governing skiing. 12
Throughout the development of the case law concerning skiing,
courts have wrestled with the analysis of the relative responsibilities of
skiers and ski area operators for injuries resulting from the "inherent
risks of skiing." There has been a concerted effort to analyze the issue
pursuant to one or more of the historically defined traditional tort law
doctrines including legal duty, primary assumption of the risk, secon-
dary assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, and comparative
dence of remedial repairs permitted); Opera v. Hyva, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 373, 450 N.Y.S.2d
615 (1982)(evidence of post-accident modifications to binding manufacturer's manual not
admissable to establish negligence; renting defective equipment creates strict liability
situation).
10. Schafer v. Aspen Skiing Co., 742 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1984) (statute of limitations
of Colorado Ski Safety Act barred action); Ritter v. Aspen Skiing Corp., 519 F. Supp. 907
(D. Colo. 1981)(statute of limitations barred wrongful death action); Wanner v. Glen El-
len Corp., 373 F. Supp. 983 (D. Vt. 1974)(statute of limitations did not bar action by a
military serviceman); Pinneo v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 14 Wash. App. 848, 545 P.2d 1207
(1976).
11. Trigg v. City and County of Denver, 784 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1986)(negligence
per se instruction appropriate in a lift accident but not a res ipsa loquitur instruction under
the facts presented); Hunt v. Sun Valley, Inc., 561 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1977)(highest degree
of care applied to lift operation, yet strict liability rejected); Riblet Tramway Co. v. Monte
Verde Corp., 453 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1972)(standard of highest degree of care as common
carrier for lift operations); Houser v. Floyd, 220 Cal. App. 2d 778, 34 Cal. Rptr. 96
(1963)(res ipsa loquitur not applicable in lift case); McDaniel v. Dowell, 210 Cal. App. 2d
26, 26 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1962)(operation of tow rope not that of a common carrier since it
does not physically carry the skier); Mannhard v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 682 P.2d 64
(Colo. App. 1983)(standard of reasonable care for operation in case where skier was killed
in an out-of-bounds avalanche since activity is not "inherently dangerous"); Jordan v.
Loveland Skiing Corp., 503 P.2d 1034 (Colo. App. 1972)(res ipsa loquitur instruction re-
jected in lift unloading case); Lewis v. Big Powderhorn Mountain Ski Corp., 69 Mich. App.
437, 245 N.W.2d 81 (1976)(strict liability not applicable in rope tow accident); Pessl v.
Bridger Bowl, 164 Mont. 389, 524 P.2d 1101 (1974)(standard of reasonable care applica-
ble in lift operations under Montana Passenger Tramway Act); Bolduc v. Herbert Scheider
Corp., 117 N.H. 566, 374 A.2d 1187 (1977)(ski lift operators are not common carriers);
Opera v. Hyva, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 373, 450 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1982)(evidence of-post-accident
modifications to binding manufacturer's manual not admissible to establish negligence;
renting defective equipment creates strict liability situation); Ford v. Black Mountain
Tramways, Inc., 110 N.H. 20, 259 A.2d 129 (1969)(ski area not a manufacturer or seller of
tramway, only an entity providing transportation service and thus no action under strict
liability): Goss v. Allen, 134 N.J. Super. 99, 338 A.2d 820 (1975)(standard of care for
minor in skier collision case is that required of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence
and experience); Lippman v. State, 83 A.D.2d 700, 442 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1981)(res ipsa lo-
quitur applicable in case where chairs with riders fell to ground); Albert v. State, 80 Misc.
2d 105, 362 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1974)(lifts under New York statutory law not common carriers),
aff'd, 51 A.D.2d 611, 378 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1976); Lawrence v. Davos, Inc., 46 A.D.2d 41, 360
N.Y.S.2d 730 (1974)(res ipsa loquitur instruction rejected in lift case where plaintiff failed
to use safety chains); Friedman v. State, 54 Misc. 2d 448, 282 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1967)(opera-
tor of a ski lift is a common carrier), modified, 31 A.D.2d 992, 297 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1967);
Coger v. State, 23 A.D.2d 935, 260 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1965)(duty of occupier of land); Math v.
State, 37 Misc. 2d 1023, 237 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1962)(operator of lift has same duty as a com-
mon carrier); Grauer v. State, 9 A.D.2d 829, 192 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1959)(operator ofa ski lift
not subject to res ipsa loquitur); Green v. Sherburne Corp., 137 Vt. 310, 403 A.2d 278
(1979)(skier collision with'unpadded utility pole; ski area subject to "ordinary" care).
12. Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development Corp., 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985); Grieb v.
Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 155 Mich. App. 484, 400 N.W.2d 653 (1986); Brewer v. Ski
Lift, Inc., 762 P.2d 226 (Mont. 1988).
[Vol. 67:2
ALLOCATION OF THE RISKS OF SKIING
negligence.' 3 It is important for courts to avoid the instinctive categori-
zation of these responsibilities under such labels without undertaking a
systematic analysis of what results may flow from the application a par-
ticular doctrine due to that doctrine's underlying nature or historical
treatment.
The tide that led to the sea of litigation in the area of ski law began
with the historic case of Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc. 14 Wright, an
intermediate level skier, was skiing with her husband at the Mt. Mans-
field ski resort in Vermont. On her first run down the slope, Wright
encountered no difficulties. However, during her second run down the
same slope, Wright fell after her ski struck a snow covered stump. As a
result of the fall, she suffered a broken leg. Wright sued Mt. Mansfield
alleging negligent maintenance of the slope.
The Vermont Federal District Court applied the doctrine of volenti
non fit injuria and held that recovery was barred.15 The court reasoned
that a skier accepts those dangers that inhere in the sport which are ob-
vious and necessary. 16 Consequently, the risk of injury that results from
such conditions is the skier's responsibility.
1 7
Relying on traditional premises liability under the common law, the
court classified Wright as an invitee of the ski area operator. The court,
therefore, concluded that the operator owed Wright a duty to inform
her of any dangers which reasonable prudence would have foreseen and
corrected. 18 In this analysis, the court found that the defendants could
not have foreseen the danger which caused Wright's injury, and, there-
fore, Mt. Mansfield did not have a legal duty to Wright "that charge[d] it
with the knowledge of these mutations of nature and require[d] it to
warn the public against such."' 19
The primary assumption of the risk doctrine was the lynch pin of
the court's rationale for determining Mt. Mansfield to be without a legal
duty to Wright. In its analysis, the court coupled the lack of a legal duty
on the part of Mt. Mansfield to the assumption of the inherent risks in
13. A thorough discussion of the defense of assumption of the risk is contained in
Roselund & Killion, Once a Wicked Sister: The Continuing Role of Assumption of Risk Under Com-
parative Fault in California, 20 U.S.F.L. REV. 255 (1986). In Blair v. Mt. Hood Meadows
Development Corp., 630 P.2d 827 (Or. 1981), the Supreme Court of Oregon articulated
the relationships among the doctrines as follows:
We used the concept of plaintiff's assumption of the risk in our prior decisions
involving risks present in sports activities even when properly conducted as a de-
scriptive phrase for the legal conclusion that defendant had no duty under the
circumstances or had breached no duty under the circumstances in failing to take
precautions against the risk .... Conduct of the plaintiff in voluntarily and unrea-
sonably encountering a risk created by the defendant's conduct, which was some-
times labeled "secondary assumption" of risk but was in reality a form of
contributory negligence, may now be compared to negligent conduct of the de-
fendant in allocating relative fault and apportioning damages under the compara-
tive fault scheme in ORS 18.470. Id. at 832.
14. 96 F. Supp. 786 (D. Vt. 1951).
15. Id. at 791.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 790.
19. Id. at 791.
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the sport by skiers. Future courts carefully considered this linkage to
separate the assumption of the "inherent risks of skiing" doctrine in
their determination of whether a legal duty existed on the part of the ski
area operator. The focus became whether the specific injury producing
risk had been "assumed" by skiers, and, if not, the ski area operator
necessarily owed a legal duty to the injured skier.
The decision in Wright was narrowed by Marietta v. Cliff's Ridge,
Inc.20 Marietta was running through the latter portion of a slalom race
course when he struck a sapling pole used as a gate marker. He seri-
ously injured his groin and abdomen area. Marietta proved that this
type of accident was common among slalom racers, and that it was an
industry standard to use more flexible materials for the gate markers.
The Supreme Court of Michigan deviated from the precedent set in
Wright. The court placed greater emphasis upon a ski area operator's
duties to its skiing patrons than on the knowledge, assumption or ac-
ceptance of risks by the skier. Marietta provided the court with sufficient
evidence to prove that the use of sapling poles created a foreseeable risk
of harm and that Marietta's injuries were, therefore, reasonably
foreseeable.
Specifically, the court held that ski area operators have a duty to
warn skiers of or prevent those conditions that present a reasonably
foreseeable risk of injury or harm. 2 1 The ski area operator was found to
have breached its duty to Marietta and was, therefore, found to be liable
for his injuries.2 2 The court added that the proper standard of care for
ski area operators in the discharge of their legal duties was that of a
reasonable man.
23
The dissent in Marietta argued that the "inherent risks of skiing"
doctrine should have been applied to bar the plaintiff's claim.
24
Through application of this theory, the court could have found that Mar-
ietta assumed the risk of injury, and, therefore, that the ski area operator
should have been relieved of liability. To the contrary, the majority felt
that a strict application of this doctrine would have unfairly and improp-
erly placed all of the risks of injury upon the skier.
Without citing the Marietta decision, the Supreme Court of Vermont
changed the tide in the sea of ski law with the landmark decision of Sun-
day v. Stratton.2 5 Sunday, a novice skier, was skiing on "The Interstate,"
a trail maintained by the ski area operator for beginners, when his skis
became entangled in snow-covered brush. As a result of the accident, he
was rendered quadriplegic. Sunday alleged that the defendant negli-
gently maintained the ski trails and failed to give notice of hidden dan-





24. Id. at 212 (Black, J., Dissenting).
25. 136 Vt. 293, 390 A.2d 398 (1978).
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gers. The court restructured and applied the assumption of inherent
risks doctrine.
Specifically, the court reasoned that primary assumption of the risk
imparts no liability on a ski area operator because the ski area operator
does not have a duty to the skier with respect to the risk that led to
injury. 26 However, the court concluded that, in this case, the defendant
did owe Sunday a duty as a matter of law.
2 7
The court dismissed the doctrine of "primary assumption of the
risk" by drawing a distinction between assuming a risk inherent in a
sport and a risk created by the condition of the "playing field" that is
provided for the sport to take place. 28 The court reasoned that
although skiers often fall, every fall is not necessarily due to an inherent
danger in the sport.2 9 If the fall is not due to a breach of duty by the
defendant, then the risk is assumed and recovery is barred. Conversely,
when the evidence indicates the existence of a duty, then the assumption
is not of the risk, "but the use of reasonable care on the part of the
defendant" 3 0 in the discharge of the duty.
The court affirmed the jury's determination that the defendant
failed to meet its duty to Sunday, an invitee, and was therefore liable for
negligence. 3 1 The court also upheld the trial court's charge to the jury
concerning contributory negligence and found that the doctrine of "sec-
ondary assumption of risk" is merely a phase of contributory
negligence.
3 2
The court emphasized the changes in grooming techniques since
the Wright decision and stated that, "[i]t is clear from the evidence that
the passage of time has greatly changed the nature of the ski industry
.... [T]he stump that injured the plaintiff in Wright may well be the
basis for negligence today in view of improved grooming techniques."
'3 3
This decision was the height of the tide that shifted the focus from a
skier's assumption of risks to a ski area operator's duty of care. The
Sunday court sent a new message: the timorous need no longer stay at
home. The message was clearly contrary to Cardozo's advice which was
26. 390 A.2d at 403. The Court stated the doctrine as follows:
Where primary assumption of risk exists, there is no liability to the plaintiff, be-
cause there is no negligence on the part of the defendant to begin with; the dan-
ger to plaintiff is not one which defendant is required to extinguish or warn
about; having no duty to begin with, there is no breach of duty to constitute
negligence.
Id. The Court's analysis focused on whether the risk was "inherent" and therefore subject
to the primary assumption of the risk doctrine since no legal duty would extend to Sunday
if the risk was found to be inherent.
27. The Court approached the issue by analyzing the existence of a legal duty and
concluded that "where the evidence indicates existence or assumption of a duty and its
breach, that risk is not one 'assumed' by the plaintiff. What he then 'assumes' is not the
risk of injury, but the use of reasonable care on the part of the defendant." Id.
28. Id. at 402.
29. Id. at 403.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 404.
33. Id. at 402.
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applied in Wright.
34
In Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc.,35 the Third Circuit applied the
primary assumption of the risk doctrine after concluding that the doc-
trine survived the enactment of a comparative negligence statute that
included a specific provision relating to downhill skiing. 36 The plaintiff
sued Seven Springs as a result of an accident in which he fell and slid
into a large pole and two snowmaking pipes. The court concluded as
follows:
[A]ssumption of risk in its primary sense is a defense that ne-
gates the defendant's duty of care. Here, plaintiff seeks to con-
struct a prima facie case of duty owed to him by the defendant.
Prosser, Law of Torts § 68, at 455 (4th ed. 1971). Defendant
then has the burden of demonstrating that no duty was owed
plaintiff. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496G (1965). De-
fendant can sustain its burden by proving that plaintiff knew of
the risk, appreciated its character, and voluntarily chose to ac-
cept it. Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp., 483 Pa. 75, 88,
394 A.2d 546, 552-53 (1978). The standard to determine
whether assumption of the risk existed is essentially subjective.
Weaver v. Clabaugh, 255 Pa. Super. 532, 536, 388 A.2d 1094,
1096 (1978).
37
Primary assumption of the risk served as the basis for absolving any legal
duty on the part of the defendant to warn or protect the plaintiff. In
Schmitz v. Cannonsburg Skiing Corp. ,38 the ski area operator was sued fol-
lowing the death of a skier who collided with a tree. The Court, relying
on Grieb v. Alpine Valley Ski Area,3 9 applied the assumption of the inherent
risks doctrine codified in the Michigan Ski Area Safety Act, 40 and con-
cluded that the skier had accepted the risk of colliding with a tree. The
Court noted:
[i]t is clear from the plain and unambiguous wording of § 22(2)
that the legislature intended to place the burden of certain risks
or dangers on skiers, rather than ski resort operators. Signifi-
cantly, the list of 'obvious and necessary' risks assumed by a
skier under the statute involves those things resulting from nat-
ural phenomena, such as snow conditions or the terrain itself;
natural obstacles, such as trees and rocks; and types of equip-
34. The Court in Wright quoted from Cardozo's opinion in Murphy v. Steeplechase
Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929).
The antics of the clown are not the paces of the cloistered cleric. The rough and
boisterous joke, the horseplay of the crowd, evokes its own guffaws, but they are
not the pleasures of tranquility. The plaintiff was not seeking a retreat for medi-
tation. Visitors were tumbling about the belt to the merriment of onlookers when
he made his choice to join them. He took the chance of a like fate, with whatever
damage to his body might ensue from such a fall. The timorous may stay at
home.
96 F. Supp. at 791.
35. 716 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir. 1983).
36. Id. at 1007 (citing 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon Supp. 1982)).
37. Smith, 716 F.2d at 1008-9.
38. 428 N.W. 2d 742 (Mich. 1988).
39. 155 Mich. App. 484, 400 N.W. 2d 653 (1986).
40. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.483 (22) (2) (Callaghen 1980).
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ment that are inherent parts of a ski area, such as lift towers and
other such structures of snow-making or grooming equipment
when properly marked. These are all conditions that are inher-
ent to the sport of skiing ..... The skier must accept these
dangers as a matter of law.
4 1
In California, the court of appeals took a different approach from
the Schmitz court in reviewing the legal duties of a ski area operator
rather than the acceptance of the inherent risks by the skier. The Cali-
fornia court of appeals analyzed the existence of a legal duty in Danieley
v. Goldmine Ski Associates,4 2 in which the plaintiff lost control of her skis
during a turn and collided with a large tree just beyond the groomed
edge of the run, sustaining serious injuries. The trial court granted the
motion from summary judgment filed by the defendant. The primary
issue concerned whether the defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff
to remove the tree that was struck by the plaintiff.
The court did rely on the analysis of the Michigan Supreme Court
in Schmitz upholding the determination by the trial court that the ski area
operator owed no legal duty to the skier to remove the tree she collided
with. The court found: "To impose a duty of the kind urged by plain-
tiffs would, in our view, have the effect of making Goldmine an insurer
of plaintiff wife's safety, as well as an insurer of the safety of every other
skier on the mountain."'4 3 The court added that a large tree growing at
the side of a run is an obvious danger and served as its own warning. It
concluded that if a duty existed to remove trees along the edges of runs,
all trees on the mountain should be cut down, which would be an inap-
propriate result.
4 4
In the event the risk does not appear to be obvious and necessary, a
ski area operator may be found to owe a duty of care to skiers. For
example, in Rosen v. LTV Recreational Development, Inc. ,45 a collision be-
tween the skier and a steel signpost embedded in concrete was not de-
termined to be an obvious danger. Consequently, the court concluded
that the skier could not have assumed the risk of his accident. 46 Even
though the skier in Rosen collided with another skier before striking the
concrete wall, the court allowed proof that the prior collision was not an
intervening legal cause.4 7 The court also rejected application of the as-
sumption of the risk as a bar to Rosen's recovery.
48
Courts began to apply the primary assumption of the risk doctrine
based upon whether the risk was inherent in the sport. In Marietta, the
court held that the resort's use of maple sapling poles as slalom markers
was not an inherent risk, particularly since the ski area operator knew of
41. 400 N.W.2d at 744.
42. No. E005891 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 1990).
43. Id. at 13-14.
44. Id. at 15.
45. 569 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1978).
46. Id. at 1121.
47. Id. at 1119-20.
48. Id. at 1121.
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more appropriate slalom pole materials. The failure to use those mater-
ials constituted negligence. As part of the determination of whether the
risk of collision with a man-made object was an inherent risk, the court
assessed the obvious and necessary nature of the object. In this case,
the court deemed the object was not an obvious and necessary danger
inherent in the sport of skiing, and, therefore, the skier was not found to
have assumed the risk of injury.
The likelihood that the danger of a collision with a natural object
will be seen as an obvious and necessary risk inherent in the sport was
lessened as a result of Sunday. The court failed to find that the existence
of such a natural obstruction presents a danger which is inherent in the
sport. Such a case-by-case review of whether a particular risk is inherent
in the sport of skiing became the preferred approach in assessing
whether the ski area operator owed a duty to the skier.
49
In Blair v. Mt. Hood Meadows Development Corp. ,50 the defendant was
found not liable after Blair skied into a ravine. Blair took an unfamiliar
route, missed a curve in the trail and skied into a ravine which separated
the ski area from the lodge. He sustained injuries to his arm and shoul-
der. Blair claimed that the defendant was negligent in failing to warn of
the ravine by flag, warning signs or complete closure of the run. The
defendant used the affirmative defense of contributory negligence by as-
serting that the plaintiff failed to keep a proper look out and failed to
maintain control of his speed and course.
The court reviewed the appropriateness of the following jury in-
struction: "Sports activities involve some risks. Every person who takes
part in a sport accepts and submits himself to the dangers that are inher-
ent in or a reasonable part of that sport."' 5 1 The court balanced the
doctrines of primary assumption of the risk and existence of a legal duty
in light of an Oregon statute abolishing "implied assumption of the
risk" and concluded that the instruction "should not have been given by
the trial judge because it focuse[d] upon the plaintiff's implied assump-
tion of risk. It is not couched in the terms of defendant's duty."' 52 This
represented another shift away from an assumption of the risk assess-
ment to a duty analysis.
In cases dealing with collisions between skiers, the courts have
looked to traditional "rules of the road" in skiing in placing the burden
of accident avoidance on the person skiing downhill or "overtaking"
others on the slope. In Ninio v. Hight,53 the plaintiff, Ninio, was partici-
pating in a beginners skiing class and was hit by a skier while the class
was stationary on the mountain. The Tenth Circuit applied the "rule of
the road" theory. Under Colorado law, when one has a duty to look for
dangerous conditions he will be presumed, in an accident scenario, to
49. Indeed, the assessment of the nature of the risk was the only criterion considered
by many courts in determining the existence of a legal duty on the ski area operator.
50. 291 Or. 293, 630 P.2d 827 (1981), reh'gdenied, 291 Or. 703, 634 P.2d 241.
51. Id. at 296, 630 P.2d at 829.
52. Id. at 301, 630 P.2d at 833.
53. 385 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1967).
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have looked where he was supposed to look and to have seen what rea-
sonably could and should have been seen. 54 Failure on the part of a
skier to comply with this duty was seen as negligence. 5 5 The court did
not take the next step and consider whether collisions between skiers
constitute one of the inherent risks of the sport.
III. THE IMPACT OF STATE LEGISLATION
A. The Codification of Laws Relating Directly to Skiing
Responding to the shift in the case law away from application of the
primary assumption of inherent risks doctrine, legislatures of most of
the skiing states enacted statutes which specifically addressed the re-
sponsibilities of skiers and ski area operators. 56 Like the development
of the case law, the various statutes focused on enumerating the respec-
tive duties of skiers and ski area operators, the assumption of the inher-
ent risks by skiers or some combination of both.
5 7
For example, Utah's legislature followed the assumption of the risk
54. Id. at 352. This instruction is traditionally used in auto accident cases.
55. This rule was applied again in LaVine v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 557 F.2d 730
(10th Cir. 1977). LaVine involved injuries to an expert skier who was hit from behind by a
certified ski instructor. The court applied the "rule of the road" theory.
56. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.135 (1983); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 602(q) & 653(i) (West
Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-44-101 to -III (1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 29-201 to -214 (West Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1101 to -1109 (Supp. 1989); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 488 & 489 (Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 143, §§ 71 1
to S (West Supp. 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 408.321 to .344 (West 1985); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-731 to -737 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 455A.010 to.190 (Michie
1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 225-A:1 to :26 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34.4A-1 to -15
(West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-15-1 to -14 (1986); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 865 to 868
(McKinney Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99C-1 to -5 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-
09-01 to -11 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4169.01 to .99 (Anderson Supp.
1988); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.970 to .990 (1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7102(c) (Purdon
Supp. 1989); R. 1. GEN. LAWS §§ 41-8-1 to -4 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-48-101 to -
107 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-51 to -54 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1037
(Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.117.010 to .040 (West Supp. 1989); W. VA.
CODE §§ 20-3A-1 to -8 (1989); WYOMING STAT. §§ 6-9-201 & -301 (1989).
57. State statutes that adopted a primary assumption of inherent risks approach in-
clude the following: ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.135 (1983); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1101 to -1109
(Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 488-489 (Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 143, §§ 71 1 to S (West Supp. 1989); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 408.321 to .344
(West 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 225-A:! to :26 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34.4A-1
to -15 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-15-1 to -14 (1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4169.01 to .99 (Anderson Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.970 to .990 (1988); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 68-48-101 to -107 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-51 to -54 (1987); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1037 (Supp. 1989); W.VA. CODE §§ 20-3A-1 to -8 (1989).
At the time of the writing of this article, the Colorado General Assembly was consider-
ing a significant amendment to the Ski Safety Act in Senate Bill 80. The Colorado Senate
and House of Representatives passed the bill and the House version was being reviewed
by the Senate before being sent to the Governor for review and signatures. The bill
adopts the primary assumption of inherent risk doctrine and sets forth those risks in a
similar fashion to the Utah statute. In addition, the proposed statute contains a cap of
$1,000,000 on the damages that may be awarded to skiers injured as a result of a ski area
operator's negligence in those cases not involving a lift. The cap may be lifted in limited
circumstances by the trial court judge. If passed in substantially its proposed form, it will
result in statutorily combining the legal duty and primary assumption of the inherent risks
doctrines in Colorado.
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approach by enumerating specific inherent risks which preclude recov-
ery.5 8 Ski area operators are required to post signs advising skiers of the
inherent risks of skiing and the limitations on liability of ski area
operators.
59
The Colorado General Assembly enacted the Colorado Ski Safety
Act ("Act") 60 in 1979 "to define the rights and liabilities existing be-
tween the skier and the ski area operator." 6 1 The Act begins with a dec-
laration that "dangers ... inhere in the sport of skiing, regardless of any
and all reasonable safety measures which can be employed.''62 The Act
then articulates the responsibilities of skiers and ski area operators, but,
contrary to the Utah approach, does not clearly address the assumption
of inherent risks doctrine.6 3 On the other hand, the Colorado General
Assembly did not impose any duties upon ski area operators to reduce
or eliminate those dangers that "inhere in the sport of skiing."
The Colorado Ski Safety Act carefully defines the duties imposed
upon ski area operators. 64 Ski area operators are required to comply
with a comprehensive sign system on each of its ski lifts and on its ski
trails. These signs provide information advising skiers about the relative
difficulty of the ski slope, closed areas and danger areas. 6 5 Operators
are also required to inform skiers of any grooming vehicles which will be
present on the slopes. 6 6 Each of the duties is discrete and clearly
defined.
The Act also addresses the responsibilities of tramway passen-
gers. 67 Each passenger of a tramway is expected to have sufficient phys-
ical dexterity, ability and knowledge to negotiate or use a tramway
safely. If the passenger does not possess such knowledge, he is required
to seek out such information sufficient to enable him to use the tramway
safely.
68
The statute also codifies the duties of skiers.6 9 Each skier has the
duty to be aware of his abilities and to ski within those abilities. Skiers
58. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-51 to -54 (1987).
59. See Feuerhelm, Lund, Chalat & Kunz, From Wright to Sunday and Beyond. Is the Law
Keeping Up With the Skiers, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 885; Comment, Utah's Inherent Risks of Skiing
Act: Avalanche From Capitol Hill, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 355.
60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-105 (1984).
61. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-102 (1984); see Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development
Corp., 711 P.2d 671, 675 n.4 (Colo. 1985).
62. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-102 (1984).
63. While the legislative declaration does acknowledge that there are some dangers
which inhere in the sport, the statute does not define those dangers, and, instead, merely
creates a presumption concerning a skier's responsibility for collisions with objects or
other skiers. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-44-102 & -109(2) (1984); see Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski
Development Corp., 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985); compare MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 143,
§ 71 0 (West Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 225-A:24 IV (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 53-09-06 (Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-48-103 (1987). See supra note 57 and
accompanying text (regarding pending legislation in Colorado).
64. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-44-106, -107 & -108 (1984).
65. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-107 (1984).
66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-108 (1984).
67. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-105 (1984).
68. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-105(1) (1984).
69. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-109 (1984).
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are further required to maintain control of their speed and course at all
times and to maintain a proper look-out to avoid collisions with skiers
and objects. 70 In addition, each skier specifically has the duty "to re-
frain from acting in a manner which may cause or contribute to the in-
jury of the skier or others." 7 1 While these duties relate to the skier's
conduct and apparently involve the inherent risks of the sport, not all of
the rules of the road were included 72 and skiers are not specifically obli-
gated to accept responsibility for injuries resulting from the inherent
risks of the sport. Furthermore, most of the statutory duties of skiers
relating to their skiing conduct can be difficult to apply to any given fact
situation. 73 A person skiing downhill also has the "primary duty ... to
avoid collision with any person or object below him."
7 4
Rather than incorporating the primary assumption of inherent risks
doctrine, the statute provides a presumption that the responsibility for a
collision by a skier with a person, natural object or man-made structure
is "solely that of the skier or skiers involved and not that of the ski area
operator." 7 5 This rebuttable presumption has been upheld as constitu-
tional in Colorado state case law. 76 The Act also includes criminal pro-
visions. Violation of several of the duties assigned to skiers could result
in criminal liability.
7 7
Colorado's rebuttable presumption provision is significantly differ-
ent from Utah's codification of the assumption of inherent risks doctrine
as the priniple focus in the assessment of liability when the injuries sus-
tained relate to an inherent risk of the sport. While the latter entirely
absolves the ski area operator, the former leaves the operator subject to
potential liability for some inherent risks. Consequently, since Colorado
has adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence, 78 secondary as-
sumption of the risk and contributory negligence by the skier have be-
come critical issues in the ski area operator's defense. However,
70. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-44-109(1) & (2) (1984).
71. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-109(5) (1984).
72. For example, several of the responsibilities contained in the Skier's Responsibility
Code are not described specifically. The Skier's Responsibility Code is an informal list of
common sense "rules of the road" endorsed by the National Ski Areas Association. They
including the following responsibilities:
(1) Ski under control and in such a manner so you can stop or avoid other skiers
or objects; (2) When skiing downhill or overtaking another skier, you must avoid
the skier below you; (3) You must not stop where you obstruct a trail or are not
visible from above; (4) When entering a trail or starting downhill, yield to other
skiers; (5) All skiers shall use devices to help prevent runaway skis; and (6) You
shall keep off closed trails and observe all posted signs.
73. While this is true concerning the requirement "to maintain control of course and
speed," there are other provisions that establish clear and discrete duties. For example, in
the case of a collision between two skiers which results in injury, neither is to leave the
scene without first providing a ski area operator employee with his name and address; in
the event such a skier leaves the vicinity for the purpose of securing aid for the injured
party, the skier is not thereby relieved of the obligation to provide his name and address to
the ski area operator. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-109(10) (1984).
74. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-109(2) (1984).
75 Id.
76. Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development Corp., 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985).
77. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-109(12)(1984).
78. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1987).
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application of these issues does not provide any assistance whatsoever in
determining whether the ski area operator had common law duties to
the skier in the first instance.
79
B. The Struggle to Fit Statutory Law with Common Law
Colorado case law is illustrative of the questions that remained after
codification. For example, particular problems arose in the application
of common law principles of premises liability. In the ten years since its
enactment, Colorado courts have had an opportunity to interpret the
Act and integrate its application with the common law.
C. The Colorado Example
In Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development Corp. ,80 the Colorado Supreme
Court held that the statement of ski area operator duties in the Act is not
an exclusive list and that additional duties may exist pursuant to com-
mon law. 8 1 The common law duties that have been applied to ski area
operators since passage of the Act are based on the doctrines of prem-
ises liability.
8 2
Until 1971, Colorado law governing a landowner's liability followed
the traditional scheme of classifying the injured party into one of three
categories - invitee, licensee or trespasser.8 3 The nature of the duty of
the landowner, and, therefore, the landowner's liability for an injury to a
person on his land, was directly linked to the status of the injured party.
There are no reported decisions in Colorado involving an action by a
skier against a ski area operator that applied the traditional premises
liability approach.8 4 However, application of the traditional analysis was
79. Therefore, a summary judgment motion which would likely be granted in ajuris-
diction with a statute similar to Utah's, depending upon whether an inherent risk is in-
volved, will not be routinely successful under statutes similar to Colorado's.
80. 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985).
81. Id. at 678. This ruling apparently resolves the issue of whether the Act extin-
guished all common law duties of ski area operators, even though the Act expressly pro-
vides that its purposes is "to define the rights and liabilities existing between the skier and
the ski area operator." COLO. REv. STAT. § 33-44-102 (1984). At least one article has
observed, after listening to the recorded testimony preceding enactment of the Act, that
the Act was intended to "set forth a definitive list of operators' obligations and that, if
complied with, would absolve the operators from further liability or responsibility for in-
jury." Chalat & Kroll, The Development of the Standard of Care in Colorado Ski Cases, 15 COLO.
Lsw. 373, 374 (1986).
82. In Clark v. Breckenridge Ski Corp., No. 84-M-506, slip op. (D. Colo. June 24,
1986), without reference to the Act, the court stated:
It must be remembered that the Breckenridge Ski Area encompasses many acres
and many variations in terrain and snow conditions. While a ski area operator
shares responsibility with other landowners for avoiding unreasonable risks of
harm because of hazards, the existence of a small dome of ice on a ski trail is not
analogous to ice cubes on a store floor.
Id. at 5.
83. Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971)(the obliga-
tions of a "landowner" extend to any party responsible for the premises including
possessors).
84. Under Wright, skiers were classified as "invitees." In the classification scheme, ifa
person was determined to be an invitee, a higher standard of care was imposed upon the
landowner than if the person was deemed to be "licensee" or "trespasser." In the case of
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overruled by Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich.8 5
The plaintiff in Mile High Fence was an on-duty police officer who
broke his leg when he stepped into a post hole located on private prop-
erty. The hole was approximately seven inches from the paved portion
of a public alley.
The court rejected the traditional analysis and adopted a novel basis
for assessing the responsibilities of landowners:
What we are holding is that status or classification of one who is
upon the property of another is not to be determinative of the
occupant's responsibility or the degree of care which he owes
to that person. Rather, the occupant, in the management of his
property, should act as a reasonable man in view of the
probability or foreseeability of injury to others. A person's sta-
tus as a trespasser, licensee or invitee may, of course, in the light of
the facts giving rise to such status, have some bearing on the
question of liability, but it is only a factor - not conclusive.
(citation omitted).
This traditional tort concept, that is, the probability of in-
jury as foreseen by a reasonable man, was properly applied by
the trial court in the instant case. It was, therefore, within the
province of the trial court to find and conclude that the Com-
pany, in leaving the post hole adjacent to a public way unpro-
tected, could foresee or, by the exercise of reasonable care,
should have foreseen, the probability that someone using the
alley might inadvertently deviate from the alley, step into the
post hole and injure himself. Under these circumstances, the
law imposes a duty upon the possessor of land to warn or pro-
tect those using the public way from the dangerous condition.
Failing to take such action, the possessor becomes liable for the
harm caused by its breach of duty.
86
The focus of the determination of the existence and scope of a legal duty
was shifted from the status of the injured person to the reasonableness
of the landowner's action. The court reasoned that the status of one
who is upon the land of another should not be the pivotal issue in the
determination of the existence of a legal duty. The question then be-
comes whether the owner, in the exercise of his legal duty, acted as a
reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others.
8 7
an invitee, the landowner had a duty to have the land in a reasonably safe condition and to
warn of dangers which were not readily visible. If the person was a licensee, a lesser de-
gree of care applied. In that case, the landowner had a duty to refrain from causing willful
or wanton injury. In the case of a trespasser, no duty was imposed upon the landowner.
See Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856, 860 (Colo. 1989).
85. 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971).
86. Id. at 548, P.2d at 314-15 (emphasis added).
87. In 1987, The Colorado General Assembly enacted a new premises liability statute.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-115 (1987). The statute closely resembled the traditional classi-
fication scheme (i.e., invitee, licensee and trespasser) which was used before Mile High
Fence by placing the focus of a landowner's liability upon the status of the injured person.
The General Assembly determined that the classification scheme was necessary due to the
unpredictability created by Mile High Fence. Gallegns v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856, 861 (Colo.
1989). Reinstatement of the classification scheme was intended to increase the protection
of landowners. However, the constitutionality of this statute was successfully challenged
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In Mannhard v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp. ,88 the Colorado court of ap-
peals held that the standard of care applicable to a ski area operator vis-
a-vis a skier who was killed in an avalanche which was triggered by the
skier in an out-of-bounds area, was that of reasonable care rather than
the highest degree of care. In its analysis, the court stated:
[T]he testimony, including that of the skier's companions, indi-
cated that avalanche danger is a phenomenon of which the pub-
lic is generally aware, and that conditions under which
avalanches are likely to occur are easily recognized by most ski-
ers so they can be avoided. These factors were fully known and
appreciated by the skier himself.
89
While this comment touches on aspects of the primary assumption of
inherent risks doctrine,90 the court did not specifically address the
doctrine.
In Rosen v. LTV Recreational Development, Inc. ,91 the Tenth Circuit
held that a separate instruction on secondary assumption of the risk was
not appropriate in light of Colorado's codification of comparative negli-
gence. The court determined that assumption of the risk should no
longer be considered as a complete defense.9 2 Rather, it should be
treated as reducing recovery in the same fashion as contributory negli-
gence. Furthermore, the court, citing Prosser, noted that a ski area op-
erator was obligated to act as a "prudent person in maintaining the
premises in a reasonably safe condition considering the probability or
foreseeability, if any, of injury to others."'93 Finally, the court added that
contributory negligence, as a defense, could minimize or negate the ski
area operator's liability.
9 4
In Rosen, the plaintiff was hurled into a steel pole after a collision
with another skier. The ski area operator argued that the injuries sus-
tained were the proximate result of the prior collision and not the negli-
gence of the ski area. The ski area operator also argued that the
possibility of a skier colliding with another skier and then crashing into a
pole is so remote as to be unforeseeable by the defendant. Further-
more, the operator argued, the first collision should be considered an
intervening and superseding legal cause. The defendant challenged the
court's application of the doctrine of contributory negligence and the
in Gallegos. Gallegos was injured after he fell down a flight of stairs while intoxicated in the
defendant's restaurant. The crux of the claim was that the owner of the restaurant was
liable to Gallegos as an invitee and that the statute offered him less protection as an invitee
than he would have received as a licensee which was contrary to the common law classifica-
tion scheme. The court agreed and found the statute in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court concluded that no governmental interest
could be rationally related to giving an invitee less protection than a licensee. Id. at 862.
Since the court found no justification for this "inverted hierarchy" of duties, historically or
logically, it held the statute to be unconstitutional. Id.
88. 682 P.2d 64 (Colo. App. 1983).
89. Id. at 66.
90. See supra note 13.
91. 569 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1978).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1120.
94. Id. at 1121.
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failure to give an instruction on assumption of the risk. However, the
court rejected each of the defendant's arguments and upheld the verdict
for the plaintiff.
Phillips v. Monarch Recreation Corp. ,95 was the first reported case to
apply the Act. The plaintiff, Phillips, brought an action against the de-
fendant, Monarch ski area, for injuries sustained in a collision on an
open run with a sno-cat which had just groomed a neighboring slope.
There were no signs posted to warn skiers of the possible presence of
sno-cat's in the area. The plaintiff argued that the Act required the post-
ing of a sign to warn skiers that equipment was being used to groom or
maintain the slope.9 6
The defendant argued that the Act required notice only when a sno-
cat was "grooming" a slope and that the sno-cat involved in the accident
with the plaintiff was not "grooming" at the time, but was traversing the
slope after grooming another slope.
97
The court ignored this argument and held that the Act was
designed to further public policy and such a strict construction would
violate that public policy. "Although the act only requires a sign when
equipment is 'grooming and maintaining' a ski slope, we hold that a
warning sign must also be posted when a sno-cat is present on the ski
slopes but is not actually 'grooming' in that particular location."
98
The trial court instructed the jury concerning the provisions of the
Act and the duties of skiers and ski area operators. The trial court did
not offer a common law negligence instruction relating to a ski area op-
erator's duties, but relied solely on the Act to instruct the jury in that
regard. 9 9 The trial court went on to state that the language of the Act
was clear and that its terms could not be modified through application of
the principles of contract based upon the purchase of a lift ticket which
stated that a skier assumes the risk of skiing. The court of appeals, in
affirming the trial court's judgment, noted that the Act allocated the par-
ties' respective duties with regard to the safety of those around them,
and upheld the exclusion of the purported agreement on the lift ticket
which was an attempt to modify those duties.' 0 0
The Tenth Circuit addressed the Act in Rimkus v. Northwest Colorado
Ski Corporation.'0 ' Rimkus, the plaintiff, sustained injuries after he hit a
rock outcropping not marked by the ski area operator.
The defendant appealed the judgment for Rimkus on the basis that
the Act required it to mark only man-made, rather than natural, objects
which are not readily visible in conditions of ordinary visibility.' 0 2 It
further argued that the "look but not see" instruction approved in Ninio
95. 668 P.2d 982 (Colo. App. 1983).
96. Id. at 985 (citing CoLo. REV. STAT. § 33-44-108(2) (1984)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 986.
99. Id. at 984-85.
100. Id. at 985.
101. 706 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir. 1983).
102. Id. at 1064 (citing COLO. REV. STA-r. § 33-44-101 to -111 (1984)). A critical evi-
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should have been given.10 3 Affirming the judgment below, the court
held that Ninio was inapplicable since there was a dispute as to whether a
reasonable man could have seen the rock outcropping and since the spe-
cific duties of skiers under the Act were included in the trial court's
instructions. 104
With respect to the evidentiary issue, the court noted that the evi-
dence of curative measures after the accident (i.e., the marking of the
rock outcropping) was admissible for the purpose of showing that
Rimkus had not committed contributory negligence since the evidence
went to the issue of the feasibility of marking the area. 10 5 The court did
not address the issues of duty or primary assumption of the risk in its
opinion. Again, the appellate review of a skiing accident was restricted
to evidentiary and instruction issues.
The Colorado Supreme Court took a thorough look at the Act in
Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development Corp. 106 Pizza, the plaintiff, was skiing
down a slope known as "Thumper" when he became airborne due to a
variation in the terrain created by a snow covered service road. Upon
landing, he suffered severe and permanent damage to his spinal column.
Pizza brought an action against the owners of the Wolf Creek Ski Area
alleging the operation of a ski area constituted an inherently dangerous
activity which compelled application of the highest degree of care and
further alleging that the "look but not see" instruction should not have
been given. In addition, Pizza challenged the constitutionality of Sec-
tion 33-44-109(2) of the Act, which created a presumption that the sole
responsibility for collisions with any person, natural object, or properly
marked man-made structure rests with the skier.' 0 7 He claimed that the
presumption violated the fourteenth amendment on vagueness and
equal protection grounds and that it was not founded on a rational evi-
dentiary basis. 108
The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The presump-
tion was considered by the court to be "at most. . . an economic regula-
dentiary issue arose concerning the admissibility of evidence that defendant marked the
rock outcropping after the accident.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1067. The court also held that the trial court was under no obligation to
instruct the jury that the law did not require the marking of natural conditions on the
slope.
105. Id. at 1065.
106. 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985).
107. The section states:
Each skier has the duty to maintain control of his speed and course at all times
when skiing and to maintain a proper lookout so as to be able to avoid other
skiers and objects. However, the primary duty shall be on the person skiing
downhill to avoid collision with any person or objects below him. It is presumed,
unless shown to the contrary by a preponderance of the evidence, that the re-
sponsibility for collisions by skiers with any person, natural object, or man-made
structure marked in accordance with section 33-44-107(7) is solely that of the
skiers involved and not that of the ski area operator.
CoLo. REV. STAr. § 33-44-109(2) (1984).
108. The remaining provisions of the Act were not included in the constitutional
challenge.
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tion, designed to limit the liability of ski area operators,"' 10 9 and,
consequently, the appropriate vagueness standard is less exacting than
that for review of criminal laws or the first amendment.' 10 The court
held:
[W]e construe the presumption as consistently as possible with
common law principles of negligence. We therefore hold that,
while the evidentiary presumption is not unconstitutionally
vague, the skier has the burden of rebutting the presumption
by presenting evidence of the ski area operator's negligence
which outweighs the presumption of the skier's sole negli-
gence .... Accordingly, a plaintiff in a ski accident case already
bears the burden of proving negligence and causation by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. It follows, therefore, that the pre-
sumption is rebutted whenever a plaintiff establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's negligence
caused the collision in which the plaintiff was injured. We must
conclude that if the legislature intended anything greater than
such a showing by the plaintiff, it would have specifically so
provided. I'
The court found that there was a rational basis for the presumption,
and, therefore, that the statute was constitutional.' 12
The court also confirmed that the standard of care applicable to the
discharge of a ski area operator's legal duty is one of reasonable care
rather than the highest degree of care when the injury related to a varia-
tion in terrain. The court's analysis was focused upon the relative duties
of the parties in the context of the Act. Pizza did not address the funda-
mental issue of how to determine the existence and scope of common
law duties and how such duties are altered or displaced by those set
forth in the Act. '3 Consequently, the Colorado Supreme Court has yet
to address that central issue. The duty issue has been the subject of a
Colorado court of appeals opinion that was not selected for publication
in Peer v. Aspen Skiing Company. 1 4 Peer, an expert skier, was skiing on
the Aspen Mountain Ski Area on opening day of the 1982-83 ski season.
109. Pizza, 711 P.2d at 675-76.
110. Id. at 676.
111. Id. at 677-78.
112. The court also stated:
However, where a skier's injury is unrelated to an operator's breach of a specific
duty, as in this case where the injury involved a variation in terrain, the legislature
has chosen to create a rebuttable presumption that the skier is solely responsible
for the collision. Given that the legislature has imposed duties on the operator,
that the skier is under a duty to maintain control and keep a proper lookout, and,
most important, that the sport is inherently risky, we conclude that there is a
rational and natural relation here between the fact proved and the fact presumed.
Id. at 678-79.
113. The court did not address the issue of the duties of a ski area operator except to
the extent that they are set forth in the Act. While the court did not comment on the
doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, it did note the declaration of the legislature as
follows: "Realizing that there are risks and dangers which will always inhere in the sport,
the legislature has attempted to identify those dangers which can reasonably be eliminated
or controlled by the ski area operator." Id. at 678.
114. No. 88CA0190 (Colo. App. Aug. 10, 1989), cerl. granted, No. 89SC548 (Colo. Feb.
20, 1990).
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Peer testified that on his first run of the day down Ruthie's Run he struck
a snow covered service road, fell and was rendered a quadriplegic. His
speed was estimated to be between 35 and 50 miles per hour. Peer also
testified that if he had been skiing significantly slower, he could have
successfully negotiated the transition between the slope and the road.
The Aspen Skiing Company ("Aspen") was found to be 100% negligent
and Peer was awarded $5,000,000.00 in damages. Aspen appealed the
judgment to the Colorado court of appeals. The two primary issues on
appeal were whether a duty was owed to Peer as an expert skier to warn
him of the transition or to groom the slope to accommodate his chosen
speed and whether the trial court improperly denied a motion for a new
trial based upon Aspen's discovery of evidence after the trial that Peer
had skied Ruthies's Run at least two times prior to that run on which the
accident occurred. The court of appeals upheld the decisions of the trial
court and affirmed the judgment. With respect to the duty issue, the
court distinguished Smith by stating that a road across a ski run was not a
natural condition and further distinguished Whitlock by finding that
Aspen had groomed the slope which was an affirmative act by the de-
fendant.'1 5 It did not apply the analytical framework set forth in those
cases; it merely concluded as follows: "Consequently, because Aspen
had undertaken the task of grooming the slopes, the trial court correctly
concluded that it incurred the concomitant duty of doing so reason-
ably.' 16 The court did not discuss this duty in relation to the duties of
skiers as articulated in the Colorado Ski Safety Act. Accordingly, it gave
no guidance with regard to the scope of the duty. Certiorari was
granted by the Colorado Supreme Court with respect to the issue of the
denial of a new trial only. Application of the Smith and Whitlock analysis
would force the courts to consider the role of the skier and the skier's
responsibilities in assessing the existence and scope of the ski area oper-
ator's duty.
D. Outside Colorado
In Grieb v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc.,' '7 the Michigan court of ap-
peals analyzed the constitutionality of a Michigan statute that provided
that skiers accept the dangers in the sport in so far as they were obvious
and necessary."18 The case involved a collision between skiers at the
defendant's ski area. In a short opinion, the court analyzed the constitu-
115. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
116. No. 88CA0190 at 3 (Colo. App. Aug. 10, 1989).
117. 155 Mich. App. 484, 400 N.W.2d 653 (1986).
118. The statute reads as follows:
Each person who participates in the sport of skiing accepts the dangers that in-
here in that sport insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those dan-
gers include, but are not limited to, injuries which can result from variations in
terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, and
other forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and their
components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible snow-
making or snow-grooming equipment.
Micti. COMP. Lsws ANN. § 408.342(2) (West 1985); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 18.483(22)(2)
(Callaghen 1980).
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tional challenge based upon the equal protection and due process
clauses. The court concluded that the statute passed the constitutional
test:
The purposes of the legislation include safety, reduction in liti-
gation and economic stabilization of an industry which substan-
tially contributes to Michigan's economy. The delineation of
ski operators' and skiers' duties and responsibilities, along with
skiers' assumption of certain expressed inherent dangers, are
reasonably related to obtaining these legitimate state objec-
tives. The safety and economic rationales under the amended
act are legitimate state objectives which are accomplished
through a reasonable scheme rationally related to the stated
legislative purpose. As such, the legislation does not violate
the equal protection or due process guarantees of the
constitution." 119
The opinion clearly supports a legislative approach to articulating the
relative rights and responsibilities of the parties including an acceptance
of the inherent risks by skiers.120 As noted above, the Colorado General
Assembly has not taken the second step in its legislation and the Colo-
rado courts have not yet done so either.
12 1
A successful constitutional attack upon portions of a ski statute oc-
curred in Montana. In Brewer v. Ski Lift, Inc.,122 the plaintiff argued that
the statute denied his fundamental right to equal protection of the laws
without the justification of a compelling state interest. The Montana
statute went beyond codifying the primary assumption of inherent risks
doctrine and specifically imposed responsibility for all risks of injury that
resulted from participation in the sport upon the skier. The court deter-
mined that the language of the statute totally absolved ski area operators
from liability, even if an accident was the direct result of the operator's
negligence. It construed the applicable provision as follows:
A skier assumes the risk and all legal responsibility for injury to
himself that results from participating in skiing; and that the re-
sponsibility for collisions with an object is the responsibility of
the skier and not the responsibility of the ski area operator; and
finally notwithstanding the comparative negligence law of Mon-
tana, a skier is barred from recovery from a ski area operator
for loss from any risk inherent in the sport of skiing, thereby
eliminating the theory of comparative negligence.1
2 3
A rational relationship could not be found by the court between the
state interest of protecting the economic vitality of the ski industry and
extinguishing all legal claims of an injured skier against the ski area op-
erator. The court, therefore, found those provisions of the Act to be
119. Grieb, 155 Mich. App: at 488, 400 N.W.2d at 656.
120. The court subsequently applied the statute in Schmitz v. Cannonsburg Skiing
Corp., 428 N.W. 2d 742 (Mich. 1988). See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (regarding pending legislation in
Colorado).
122. 762 P.2d 226 (Mont. 1988)(concerning MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-731 to 737
(1983)).
123. Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
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unconstitutional. 
124
Although the ruling by the Montana court is the only rejection of
fundamental portions of a ski statute, the constitutionality of similar
statutes may, in view of Brewer, be subject to close judicial scrutiny.
12 5
The focus will be upon how the statutes allocate responsibilities be-
tween skiers and ski area operators and whether skiers are totally pre-
cluded from stating their claim. As in Montana, if an injured skier is
forced to bear all of the responsibility for all accidents of any kind what-
soever that result from the participation of skiers in the sport, the statute
may not withstand a rational relationship test.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Existence and Scope of the Relative Duties
As illustrated in the various statutory approaches, a tension contin-
ues to exist in the relationship between the primary assumption of inher-
ent risks doctrine and the determination of whether a particular risk
should be classified as "inherent." While many statutes have addressed
this issue, the relationship of statutory and common law principles of
negligence in this area continues to evolve. A return to the fundamental
precepts of tort law, as recently articulated by the Colorado Supreme
Court, will provide the proper and necessary focus in the evolution of
these relationships in the future.
The first and most critical element of the tort of negligence is "the
existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff."'
126 Under
Colorado law, the issue of "whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty
to act to avoid injury[,] is a question of law to be determined by the
court.' 12 7 Only if the court has answered this threshold question in the
affirmative, may the trier of fact then consider whether the defendant
acted reasonably in the discharge of the duty. In the absence of a legal
duty, there can be no breach of duty, and, therefore, no negligence.1
28
The existence of a legal duty is entirely distinct from the determina-
tion of what standard of care is applicable to the discharge of that duty.
If a legal duty exists, then, in most instances, the actor must exercise
reasonable care in the discharge of that duty. 12 9 As noted above, under
Colorado law, the standard of reasonable care applies to ski area opera-
tors once a legal duty has been found to exist.'
30
124. Id. at 230.
125. See Morrison & Morrison, Constitutional Challenges to Tort Reform: Equal Protection and
State Constitutions, 64 DEN. U. L. REv. 719 (1988).
126. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 155 (Colo. 1986).
127. Smith v. City and County of Denver, 726 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Colo. 1986); accord
Metropolitan Gas Repair Service v. Kulik, 621 P.2d 313 (Colo. 1980); W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 37 (5th ed.
1984).
128. Smith, 726 P.2d at 1128.
129. See supra note 11.
130. Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development Corp., 711 P.2d 671, 683 (Colo. 1985)(re-
jecting contention that standard of highest degree of care applies to ski area operators);
Mannhard v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 682 P.2d 64, 65 (Colo. App. 1983).
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Under the common law, there is no legal duty to protect sports par-
ticipants from the inherent risks of the sports in which they choose to
engage. Since 1986, the Colorado Supreme Court has considered the
criteria governing the imposition of common-law duties within the con-
text of recreational activities on two separate occasions.
In Smith v. City and County of Denver, '3 ' and in University of Denver v.
Whitlock, 13 2 the court addressed the existence and scope of a land-
owner's duty to protect a recreational user of his property from injury.
Smith and' Whitlock each involved recreational activities with inherent
risks: river diving in Smith and trampoline acrobatics in Whitlock. The
plaintiffs in both cases were rendered quadriplegic as a result of their
accidents. In each case, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs'
complaints, holding that the defendants had no legal duty to protect the
plaintiffs from their accidents and injuries.
In Smith, the court framed the common-law duty analysis as follows:
Whether the law should impose a duty requires consideration
of many factors including, for example, the risk involved, the
foreseeability and likelihood of injury as weighed against the
social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the bur-
den of guarding against injury or harm, and the consequences
of placing the burden upon the actor.
13 3
After applying these criteria, the court concluded that the duties alleged
by the plaintiff did not exist as a matter of law:
[The defendant] did not have a duty to warn the petitioner of
the inherent dangers involved in the activity in which he chose
to engage because the potential for danger was readily appar-
ent. Moreover, because the alleged hazard existed as a result
of the natural condition of the terrain and river at The Chutes,
the [defendant] had no duty to make the area safer.
134
Although a risk of injury to the plaintiff was "foreseeable" in a general
sense, knowledge of and control over the specific factors contributing to
the nature and level of that risk were exclusively within the plaintiff's
ken. Accordingly, the court refused to impose on the defendant a duty
to protect the plaintiff from the consequences of his personal recrea-
tional choice.
As in Smith, the Supreme Court's decision in Whitlock rested entirely
upon the question of duty. After reviewing the Smith criteria, the court
stated:
[The Smith] list [of factors] was not intended to be exhaustive
and does not exclude the consideration of other factors that
may become relevant based on the competing individual, pub-
lic and social interests implicated in the facts of each case. A
131. 726 P.2d 1125 (Colo. 1986).
132. 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1986).
133. Smith, 726 P.2d at 1127.
134. Id. at 1128. In Bittle v. Brunetti, 750 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1988), the Colorado Supreme
Court relied in part on Smith to conclude that a property owner owes no duty to pedestri-
ans to keep abutting sidewalks clear of snow and ice. "[W]e generally have been unwilling
to impose liability for injuries caused by natural obstacles or conditions." Id. at 53.
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court's conclusion that a duty does or does not exist is an ex-
pression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is (or is not) entitled
to protection. No one factor is controlling, and the question of
whether a duty should be imposed in a particular case is essen-
tially one of fairness under contemporary standards - whether
reasonable persons would recognize a duty and agree that it
exists. 135
Applying the Smith criteria, the court then rejected the plaintiff's claim
that the defendant had "a duty .... to protect [him] . . .because of the
foreseeability of the injury, the extent of the risks involved in trampoline
use, the seriousness of potential injuries, and the [defendant's pur-
ported] superior knowledge concerning these matters."' 1 6 The court
also held that "the fact that [the defendant] is charged with negligent
failure to act rather than negligent affirmative action is a critical factor
that strongly militates against the imposition of a duty ...... 137
In the Colorado Supreme Court's most recent consideration of the
duty issue, Observatory Corp. v. Daly, 13 8 the court stated that a lower
"court must exercise a prudential judgment" based on the factors stated
in Smith and Whitlock, and that those cases are not to be limited only to
those recreational activities involved in each case. 139 The court also
noted that resolution of the duty issue in every case rests upon funda-
mental considerations of policy. Furthermore, the court held that the
analysis of the asserted duty in each case should be one which is "mind-
ful of the magnitude of the burden that [is] implicated by imposing [a]
legal duty" and the practical consequences of such a finding.
140
To review the existence and scope of a legal duty and the attendant
issue of primary assumption of inherent risks, in an appropriate and
comprehensive manner, it is critical that an inquiry be made into the
analytical bases that fundamentally underlie the labels of these doc-
trines. Application of the criteria set forth in Smith and Whitlock will give
proper focus to the determination of whether a legal duty exists on the
ski area operator in a particular case or whether the injured skier must
accept and assume responsibility for the risk that caused the injury.
B. The Nature of the Risk Involved
An evaluation of the risks of skiing begins with the fact that the
sport necessarily involves inherent risks of injury. The essential nature
of the sport requires that it be practiced in a rugged winter environ-
ment. The court in Wright articulated the basic attributes of the sport
which involve inherent risks of injury:
Skiing is a sport; a sport that entices thousands of people; a
135. Whitlock, 744 P.2d at 57.
136. Id. at 61.
137. Id. at 57.
138. 780 P.2d 462 (Colo. 1989).
139. Id. at 466.
140. Id. at 469.
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sport that requires an ability on the part of the skier to handle
himself or herself under various circumstances of grade,
boundary, mid-trail obstruction, corners and varied conditions
of the snow. Secondly, it requires good judgment on the part
of the skier and recognition of the existing circumstances and
conditions. Only the skier knows his own ability to cope with a
certain piece of trail. Snow, ranging from powder to ice, can be
of infinite kinds. Breakable crust may be encountered where
soft snow is expected. Roots and rocks may be hidden under a
thin cover. A single thin stubble of cut brush can trip a skier in
the middle of a turn. Sticky snow may follow a fast running
surface without warning. Skiing conditions may change
quickly. What was, a short time before, a perfect surface with a
soft cover on all bumps may fairly rapidly become filled with
ruts, worn spots, and other manner of skier-created
hazards....
To hold that the terrain of a ski trail down a mighty moun-
tain, with fluctuation in weather and snow conditions that con-
stantly change its appearance and slipperiness, should be kept
level and smooth, free from holes or depressions, equally safe
for the adult or the child, would be to demand the impossible.
It cannot be that there is any duty imposed on the owner and
operator of a ski slope that charges it with the knowledge of
these mutations of nature and requires it to warn the public
against such. 14'
These observations on the nature of the risk in the sport remain true
today. 14 2 Consistent with the approach that numerous courts have
141. Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc. 96 F. Supp. 786, 791 (D. Vt. 1951).
142. In Wright, the court applied the common-law doctrine of volenti nonfit injuria ("he
who consents to an act is not wronged by it"). The modern application of this doctrine
traces its roots to Cardozo's landmark opinion in Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.,
250 N.Y. 472, 166 N.E. 173 (1929). In Murphy, the plaintiff had been injured when she
chose to partake in a carnival "fun house" activity, which presented an obvious risk of
injury. In explaining why there could be no recovery in this circumstance, Cardozo stated
the rule succinctly: "one who takes part in such sports accepts the dangers that inhere in it
so far as they are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the risk of a thrust by his
antagonist or a spectator at a ball game the chance of contact with the ball." Id. 250 N.Y.
at 474, 166 N.E. at 174. Since Wright, several courts have applied the doctrine to a variety
of sports activities to hold that no legal duty is owed to the participants therein. See, e.g.,
Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1988)(no legal duty to
protect jockey bumped by another jockey in violation of safety rule); Neinstein v. Los An-
geles Dodgers, Inc., 185 Cal. App. 3d 176, 229 Cal. Reptr. 612 (1986)(no legal duty to
protect baseball spectators from "natural hazards of foul balls"); Ridge v. Kladnick, 42
Wash. App. 785, 713 P.2d 1131 (1986)(no legal duty to protect skater from "clear and
obvious" risks of hazardous skating game). Several courts also considered the inherent
risks of skiing. See, e.g., Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 716 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir.
1982)(skier's loss of control and slide into unpadded snowmaking apparatus); Nielsen v.
Jack Frost Mountain Co., No. 87-0532 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1988)(skier's fall caused by large
visible chunks of ice on snow surface), aft d, No. 88-1496 (3d Cir. Nov. 1, 1988); Leopald v.
Okemo Mountain, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 781 (D. Vt. 1976)(skier's uncontrolled slide and en-
suing collision with unpadded lift tower); McDaniel v. Dowell, 210 Cal. App. 2d 26, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 140 (1962)(skier's loss of control and collision with another skier); Blair v. Mt. Hood
Meadows Development Corp., 291 Or. 293, 630 P.2d 927 (1981)(skier's loss of control
and fall into ravine).
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taken in the past, 14 3 an important consideration, but not the only con-
sideration, is that the elements creating the risk of injury are inherent in
the essential nature of the sport.
C. The Likelihood of Injury Versus Social Utility
Although injuries resulting from inherent risks are generally fore-
seeable, the "likelihood of injury" is necessarily dependent upon the
skier's own judgment and conduct while actively engaged in the sport.
While such injuries are often foreseeable in a general sense, and while
hindsight always provides marvelous clarity, numerous factors must be
considered in each case to determine whether the particular injury was
specifically likely and foreseeable. The location of the accident, the time
of the accident, the snow conditions, the weather conditions, the injured
skier's ability level, the nature of the accident, the skier's conduct and
knowledge, and a myriad of additional relevant factors must be reviewed
in the assessment of whether the particular injury and its cause were
foreseeable or likely. Skier falls and loss of control are random events
that can lead to injury at any time and at any location within a ski area;
these considerations must be weighed against the benefits of the sport in
general.
D. The Burden of Guarding Against the Risk
The magnitude of the burden of guarding against the risk of injury
to skiers is wide-ranging. Obviously, no ski area operator can know the
specific skills and abilities of the millions of skiers who venture onto the
slopes. Nor can any ski area operator control individual skiers' decisions
regarding their speed, course and other behavior while skiing under the
varying conditions which exist at any given time on any given ski moun-
tain or ski slope. Since a skier's loss of control can be an entirely ran-
dom event, serious consideration must be given to the feasibility and
practicality of requiring ski area operators to anticipate such events and
protect skiers from them. While ski area operators cannot expect to be
totally absolved from any responsibility, 144 it is virtually impossible to
protect all skiers from the inherent risks in the sport or to eliminate such
risks in an effort to make the mountain "crashproof."'
4 5
For example, the Colorado Ski Safety Act requires the posting of
signs at specific locations throughout the ski area. While the cost of de-
veloping and maintaining a sign system may be an acceptable burden, a
significant expansion of this obligation may not result in an increased
benefit to the skier and could jeopardize the economics of a number of
ski areas. Again, this specific requirement calls for a thorough and de-
tached balancing of interests. Such an analysis should be applied to
143. See, e.g., Blair v. Mt. Hood Meadows Development Corp., 291 Or. 293, 630 P.2d
927 (1981).
144. See, e.g., Brewer v Ski-Lift, Inc., 762 P.2d 226 (Mont. 1988).
145. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-44-101 to -111 (1984) (the Colorado Ski Safety
Act); see Danieley v. Goldmine Ski Assoc., No. E00589 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 1990).
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each duty assessment. This process should also facilitate the integration
of statutory duties with the applicable common law.
E. The Consequences of Placing the Burden Upon the Actor
The consequences of placing the burden of accepting responsibility
for inherent risks upon the actor (i.e., the individual skier in most ski
cases) can be minimal. Each individual skier is in the best position to
assess his or her own subjective abilities in light of the availaible objec-
tive information such as the relative difficulty of the terrain and prevail-
ing weather and snow surface conditions. Such an analysis incorporates
the elements of the primary assumption of inherent risks doctrine as dis-
cussed above. As the court in Leopold v. Okemo Mountain, Inc. 146 found:
The skier, not the ski area operator, is the logical one to make
the choice as to whether he should proceed and assume the
consequences of skiing in an area where a plainly apparent and
necessary danger exists. Were it otherwise, ski trails, among
the most enjoyable places to ski, might well have to be elimi-
nated because of the obvious hazards of trees, rocks and ad-
verse terrain which border every trail and which every skier
faces with some degree of peril when he makes his decision to
venture forth thereon.
14 7
The Colorado court of appeals likewise recognized the role of per-
sonal choice in the apportionment of responsibilities between the skier
and the ski area operator. In Mannhard, the court held that an avalanche
was a snow condition which the skier had the duty to avoid. -[A] skier
has little or no control over his movements while riding a chairlift or
gondola and must necessarily depend on the operator for his safe pas-
sage. Conversely, while on the slopes, as here, the skier has complete
freedom of movement and choice."'
14 8
The inquiry to be made should include a consideration of the fac-
tors which underlie the primary assumption of inherent risks doctrine.
Obviously, this also entails regard for the nature of the individual risk.
In addition, the statutory duties of skiers must be carefully reviewed and
integrated into the balancing of interests.
F. Public and Social Interests
In general, expanding the availability of skiing is in the "public and
social interest." Many of the legislative declarations to the statutes gov-
erning skiing refer to the need to maintain the sport in view of the indus-
try's economic contribution to the state as well as the need to properly
allocate responsibilities among skiers and ski area operators.14 9 The de-
termination of the existence and scope of a specific legal duty on the
146. 420 F. Supp. 781 (D. Vt. 1976).
147. Id. at 787 n.2. See also Nielson v. Jack Frost Mountain Co., No. 87-0532 (E.D. Pa.
May 23, 1988), aff'd, No. 88-1496 (3d Cir. Nov. 1, 1988).
148. 682 P.2d 64, 66 (Colo. App. 1983).
149. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-102 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-51
(1987).
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part of ski area operators necessarily involves consideration of social
policy in assessing responsibility for injuries to skiers, and, conse-
quently, in choosing who is to bear the risk of loss. In making policy
assessments, it is important to balance the essence of the sport of skiing,
the freedom of movement and choice in a mountain environment,
against pressures to protect skiers from themselves. Reference to the
legislative declarations of many ski statutes can provide direction in bal-
ancing the various policy issues. Reduced to its essence, the determina-
tion of the existence and scope of a legal duty is one based upon public
policy considerations.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the decision in the historical case of Wright v. Mt. Mansfield
Lift, Inc. ,150 the area of ski law has been through numerous ebbs and
flows. After the Wright decision, the primary assumption of inherent
risks doctrine prevailed. However, the focus shifted awfiy from the exist-
ence of a duty upon the skier to a novel focus upon ski area operators.
The expansion of litigation caused many state legislatures to create ski
statutes assigning the duties of ski area operators, lift operators, and
skiers. The law remains in a state of flux as it evolves.1
5 1
Although the sport of skiing will probably never return to the days
of Wright, when the timorous were advised to remain at home, a return
to the basic tenets of tort law will provide analytical tools and a frame-
work for appropriately assessing the numerous risks in the sport and
allocating the responsibility for injuries that are incurred by skiers. As a
result, the law affecting the sport of skiing will provide a comprehensive
approach to determine the existence and scope of the relative legal du-
ties and the nature and extent of a skier's responsibility for those risks
that inhere in the sport.
150. 96 F. Supp. 786 (D. Vt. 1951).
151. See Feuerheim, Lund, Chalat & Kunz, From Wright to Sunday and Beyond: Is the Law
Keeping Up With the Skiers, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 885, 918.
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